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THE FEDERAL BRIBERY STATUTE
AND THE ETHICS OF
PURCHASING TESTIMONY
CAMILLE KNIGHT*

INTRODUCTION
For eleven years, prosecutors paid Leslie White for his
testimony.1 Mr. White, a convicted kidnapper and bank robber,
testified against several fellow inmates with whom he was housed
while awaiting trial for various charges.! Los Angeles County
prosecutors must have thought he was an extremely good listener,
since most of the time the inmates he testified against confessed
their crimes to him.' With this information, White contacted
prosecutors, who gave him leniency in exchange for his testimony."
In the process, he helped put at least a dozen accused murderers,
burglars, arsonists, and other felons in jail.' The only problem was
that, in all of those cases, White lied.6
In 1988, White described conversations he had with fellow
inmates during which he learned what charges they faced and the
details of their cases. He used the facts obtained in order to
fabricate the "confessions" of others he later provided to
prosecutors.! He even demonstrated his technique for an audience
of law enforcement officials.8 In their presence, White telephoned
a district attorney and, falsely posing as a police officer, was able
to obtain detailed information about a murder case.9 After this
startling demonstration, a review of Los Angeles County criminal
* J.D. Candidate, June 2000. The Author wishes to thank Peter A.
Lupsha, Ph.D., for his ideas and advice, and Ronald A. Smith, J.D., and
Timothy P. O'Neill, J.D., for their insight and assistance. Finally, the Author
extends her sincere gratitude to Thomas D. Decker, J.D., for his guidance,
support, and unparalleled mentoring regarding this Comment.
1. Ted Rohrlich, Jail Informant Owns Up to Perjury in a Dozen Cases, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 1990, at Al.
2. Id.

3. Id.
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. Rohrlich, supra note 1, at Al.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. Id.
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cases revealed that dozens of people might have been convicted on
the basis of perjured testimony provided by White and other savvy
inmates employing similar techniques." °
Ten years after White's demonstration, a federal district court
in Kansas convicted Sonya Singleton of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine and money laundering." The evidence against Singleton
included records of several wire transfers bearing her signature
and the testimony of Napoleon Douglas, an alleged coconspirator." In return for Douglas' testimony against Singleton,
the prosecutors promised him that they would 1) request a
downward departure 2 below his mandated sentence, 2) not
prosecute Douglas for drug-related activities currently under
investigation, and 3) advise the sentencing court and the
Mississippi Parole Board of his cooperation. 4
On July 10, 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
overturned Singleton's conviction, holding that the government
violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) 5 by entering into the plea agreement
with Douglas and effectively offering him what the court deemed a
6
bribe in exchange for his testimony."
The three-judge panel found

10. Philip Hager & Ted Rohrlich, Justices Limit Access to Informant Files,

L.A.

TIMES,

Dec. 4, 1990, at A3.

11. United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1343 (10th Cir. 1998),
vacated and overruled by United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1297
(10th Cir. 1999). Singleton was convicted of one count of conspiracy and seven
different counts of money laundering. Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1297. She
received 46 months imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently,
followed by three years of probation. Id.
12. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344.
13. Id. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (as amended) contains
provisions allowing prosecutors to motion courts to reduce sentences below
mandatory minimums if a defendant has provided assistance in the
prosecution of other individuals. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (Supp. 1999)
(allowing for reducing sentences below the mandatory minimum). See also
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (allowing for reduction for post-sentencing assistance).
14. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344. The government retained sole discretion to
determine whether Douglas' cooperation constituted "substantial assistance."
Id. For this reason, Douglas had a motive to provide as much testimony as
possible against his co-conspirators. In the written plea agreement, the
government did not explicitly promise to move for a reduced sentence. Id.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) states:
[w]hoever... directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything of
value to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or
affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, before any court, any committee or either
House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency, commission, or officer
authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take
testimony, or for or because of such person's absence therefrom.., shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (Supp. 1999).
16. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344.
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that the government offered something of value-its promise not
to charge Douglas for certain crimes and to intervene on his behalf
in front of the sentencing court and the parole board-in exchange
for his testimony. 7 The court noted that the statute covered
whomever makes such offers in exchange for testimony, and that
the government was included in the class of people the statute
intended to regulate. 8 Finally, the court stated that even though
the government's promises were made in exchange for "truthful"
testimony, the statute did not distinguish between true and false
testimony nor did it justify such promises."
The ruling sparked widespread controversy. Prosecutors,
shocked by the ruling, proclaimed that the decision was contrary
to precedent and common practice." Attorneys for defendants
across the country applauded the ruling and rushed to file motions
to exclude testimony of co-conspirators and other witnesses

17. Id.
18. Id. at 1358.
19. Id. at 1360.
20. See Mary Hladky, Prosecutors Eager to Fight Exclusion of Testimony
Derived from Leniency, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., July 30, 1998, at Al
(citing a motion filed by federal prosecutors in the Southern District of Florida
in response to a defendant's motion to exclude testimony in United States v.
Lowery). The prosecutors argued that the Singleton ruling was a radical
departure from traditional prosecutorial power, and that application of
Singleton would make criminals out of federal prosecutors and judges across
the country. Id. Furthermore, the rule would force suppression of important
evidence and cripple law enforcement agencies. See also Shannon P. Duffy,
Bombshell Singleton Ruling Vacated by 10th Circuit, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, July 14, 1998, at 3 (citing a brief filed by the Department of
Justice in response to a defendant's motion to exclude testimony pursuant to
the decision in Singleton). Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert Zauzmer stated
that the Singleton ruling could have a devastating prospective application in
many criminal investigations if followed, and that the court's ruling was
contrary to a prosecutorial practice that has flourished for centuries. Id. See
also Shannon P. Duffy, Local Defenders Quickly Jump on 10th Circuit's
Singleton Bandwagon. Prosecutors: Decision Wrong; Cite Volumes of
Precedent, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 13, 1998, at 1 (citing a response
by the U.S. Attorney's Office to a defendant's motion to exclude evidence filed
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania). Assistant U.S. Attorneys Peter F.
Schenck and Frank R. Costello, Jr. argued that the Singleton opinion was
without precedent, and that Congress never intended for § 201(c)(2) to apply to
prosecutors, because it would then conflict with other congressional grants of
authority allowing common prosecutorial practices.
Id. Furthermore,
Schenck and Costello argued that volumes of precedent supported the wellknown prosecutorial practice of promising witnesses leniency in exchange for
testimony. Id. See also David E. Rovella & Gail Diane Cox, Fallout from
'Singleton' Bribe Ruling, NAT'L. L.J., Aug. 24, 1998, at Al (stating Assistant
U.S. Attorney Sean Connelly's opinion that the ruling "works absurd results,"
and setting the prosecutors' main argument that without the use of plea
bargains, caseloads of courts would multiply greatly and strain court
resources).
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testifying pursuant -to plea agreements. 21
Within days, two
separate Senate bills were proposed to amend the statute so as to
exempt prosecutors from its application.22 Prosecution and defense
bar organizations lobbied Congress with regard to the pending
legislation.n
Commentators opined that the ruling would not
stand, and that even if it did, § 201(c)(2) would be amended by
Congress to exempt prosecutors.2
The Singleton panel's statement that testimony provided
pursuant to a plea agreement 2l is inherently unreliable is not a

new concept.'

In the background of the controversy sparked by

Singleton is a longtime debate, in both constitutional and ethical
contexts, regarding how much discretion prosecutors should have
and how they should be allowed to utilize it. 27 Prosecutors defend
21. See Rovella & Cox, supra note 20, at Al (stating that defense lawyers
across the country began to file motions to exclude evidence after the
Singleton ruling came down). See also Marcia Coyle & David E. Rovella,
Stunning Rulings Curtail Prosecutors'Power, NAT'L L.J., July 20, 1998, at Al
(stating that "jubilant defense lawyers claimed vindication after years of
complaints about such arrangements," and quoting Larry Pozner, Presidentelect of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, as stating that
the ruling directly addressed "decades of government-sanctioned bribery").
22. S. 2311, 105th Cong. § 201 (1998); S. 2314, 105th Cong. § 201 (1998).
23. Robert Schmidt, Bills Would Negate Ruling Against Deals for Leniency,
FULTON CouNTY DAILY REP., Aug. 3, 1998. Senator Kohl consulted the
Justice Department office with regard to Senate Bill No. 2311, but the Justice
Department "had not decided how to approach the bills." Id. The defense bar
began efforts to slow introduction or passage of the legislation. Id. Gerald
Lefcourt, president of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
thought that Congress should wait to amend the bill until after the Tenth
Circuit held its en banc hearing. Id. Also, Lefcourt stated that Congress
should take its cue from Singleton and hold hearings for prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and judges to express their views on the issue. Id.
24. See Naftali Bendavid, Ruling on Leniency Deals Raises Outcry, CHI.
TRIB., July 15, 1998, at Al (quoting University of Chicago law professor Albert
Alschuler as stating that he would be "willing to bet 99-1 that this decision
will not be the law in a year").
25. Testimony provided pursuant to a plea agreement is hereinafter
referred to as "accomplice testimony." While "accomplice" is a term defined by
some courts, it is used here for purposes of grammatical simplicity. In this
Comment, "accomplice testimony" may include, but is not limited to, testimony
by accomplices, co-conspirators, confidential informants, jailhouse informants,
and other persons testifying pursuant to plea agreements.
26. See Cynthia L. Cooper, Let's Not Make a Deal, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1998, at
34-35 (stating that what is new about the argument in Singleton is that Ms.
Singleton's lawyer, John Val Wachtel, relied on the statutory construction of §
201(c)(2) instead of due process grounds). Wachtel states he adopted the
argument from an article by J. Richard Johnston. Id. at 34. See also J.
Richard Johnston, Paying the Witness: Why is it OK for the Prosecution, but
Not for the Defense?, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1997, at 21.
27. See Coyle & Rovella, supra note 21, at Al (stating that "few people"
were aware of this issue, although it has been "lurking" in the wording of §
201(c)(2) for the past 36 years, and despite the fact that the issue was
addressed in regard to defendants' Sixth Amendment rights).
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their powers to offer plea agreements to witnesses by arguing that
without such incentives, large criminal conspiracies would never
be infiltrated. 28 Attorneys for defendants respond that suspects
may be wrongly convicted on the basis of unreliable testimony
tendered by accomplices, co-conspirators, or others motivated to
gain leniency; these people frequently gain vastly reduced
sentences.29
This Comment examines Singleton, its progeny, and the
arguments for and against the panel's decision. It then reviews
the longtime debate over testimony given pursuant to plea
agreements,
focusing on both the inherent unreliability of
testimony that such agreements produce and previous attacks on
such testimony under due process and ethical principles. This
Comment suggests that the current remedies to combat the
unreliability of accomplice testimony are ineffective, and then
explores the argument against accomplice testimony in relation to
the rules of ethics governing the Bar. This Comment concludes
that the admission of accomplice testimony pursuant to plea
agreements is adverse to the stated interests of the American
justice system, and that such plea agreements violate the rules of
ethics. Finally, this Comment offers various remedies geared
toward allowing prosecutors to investigate and prosecute crimes,
while at the same time ensuring defendants' rights to a fair trial
and enforcing the rules of ethics.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Facts in Singleton
In 1992, investigators for the Wichita Police Department
contacted Western Union agents to determine whether that wire
service was being used to transfer the proceeds of drug sales.&
The investigators discovered several wire transfers of more than
$1,000 that bore similar names and addresses of senders and
recipients.3 The investigative trail led police to a group of local
women who allegedly were recruited to wire the proceeds of
cocaine sales to California, where the money would be used to

28. See Supplemental Brief for the United States at 15-16, United States v.
Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1343 (10th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-3178) (arguing that
absent testimony pursuant to plea agreements, the government would not be
able to prosecute conspirators in drug and RICO cases).
29. See, e.g., Rohrlich, supra note 1, at Al (describing how several
defendants were convicted on the basis of allegedly perjured testimony
provided pursuant to plea agreements).
30. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1343. It is unclear from the appellate decision
exactly how the Wichita Police Department received information that the
conspirators used Western Union to transfer drug money. Id.
31. Id.
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purchase more cocaine. 2 Singleton was identified as one of the
wire senders after handwriting experts confirmed that her
signature appeared on paperwork for several of the suspect wire
transfers."
Singleton and others were charged with multiple counts of
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and money laundering."
The
government's evidence against Singleton included the testimony of
her alleged co-conspirator, Douglas, who agreed to a plea
agreement with the United States Attorney in exchange for his
statements. 5
His agreement was not unique, but rather
resembled thousands like it that are used every day by prosecutors
across the country. 6
Under the agreement, the prosecution would not charge
Douglas with violations of the Drug Abuse and Prevention Act
arising out of the conspiracy under investigation. 7 He would plead
guilty to money laundering.' If he testified against Singleton, the
government would then move for downward departure of his
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), and advise the Mississippi
Parole Board of his cooperation.39 However, the plea agreement
clearly stated that the government retained sole discretion in
determining whether Douglas' cooperation
amounted to
"substantial assistance."40
Singleton was convicted on all charges. On appeal, the threejudge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
considered whether the plea agreement with Douglas was
prohibited either by § 201(c)(2) of the United States Code or
Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(b).4' If his testimony was
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1344.
34. Id.
35. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1343.
36. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Cashing in the Coin of Leniency, CONN. L. TRIB.,
July 13, 1998 (stating that the Singleton ruling, although unprecedented, was
not an instance of a judge "straining for a pretext to invalidate an especially
smelly deal. This was a routine deal.") See also Cooper, supra note 26, at 34
(stating that "[tihe agreement with the witness against Singleton is so
ordinary that few would blink at it"); Emily Heller, Defenders Saw Snitch
Ruling as Too Good to be True-and It Was, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., July
15, 1998 (quoting former U.S. Attorney Kent B. Alexander as stating: "[y]ou
could not have come up with a more vanilla plea agreement," than the one
offered to Douglas).

37. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Douglas' testimony about his understanding of the terms of the
agreement was "somewhat confused." Id. However, Douglas understood that
the actual award of a reduction in his sentence would be granted at the
discretion of the sentencing court. Id.
41. Rule 3.4(b) of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct states: "[a]
lawyer shall not.., offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by
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prohibited under either the statute or the ethical rule, it should
have been suppressed.42 The court found that the government's
conduct violated both the statute and the ethical rule.' Applying
the language and plain meaning of § 201(c)(2), the court held that
"the class of persons who can violate the statute is not limited.""
The term "whoever," as it applies to § 201(c)(2), includes everyone
who "either directly or indirectly gives, offers or promises
[something] of value to [a witness], for or because of sworn
testimony" before a court. 45 The government, therefore, violated
the statute by promising things of value, such as not to prosecute
Douglas for drug offenses and to intervene on his behalf in front of
the sentencing court and the parole board. 6 The court reasoned
law." KANSAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) (1999). The rule
is adopted from Rule 3.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) (1999).
See also
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7-28 (1999) which
states:
[a] lawyer shall not pay or agree to pay a non-expert witness an amount
in excess of reimbursement for expenses and financial loss incident to
his being a witness; however, a lawyer may pay or agree to pay an
expert witness a reasonable fee for his services as an expert. But in no
event should a lawyer pay or agree to pay a contingent fee to any witness.
A lawyer should exercise reasonable diligence to see that his client and
lay associates conform to these standards.
Id. (emphasisadded). The Model Code states:
there certainly can be no greater incentive to perjury than to allow a
party to make payments to it opponents [sic] witnesses under any guise
or on any excuse, and at least attorneys who are officers of the court to
aid it in the administration of justice, must keep themselves clear of any
connection which in the slightest degree tends to induce witnesses to
testify in favor of their clients.
Id. at n.48 (citing In re Robinson, 103 N.E. 160 (1913)). Compare SUPREME
COURT OF ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Art. VIII, Rule 3.3(15)
(1999), which states that a lawyer shall not:
[play, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a
witness contingent upon the content of the witness' testimony or the
outcome of the case, but a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce
in the payment of expenses reasonably incurred in attending or
testifying, and a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert
witness.

Id.
42. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1343.
43. Id. at 1359.
44. Id. at 1345.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (Supp. 1999).
46. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1345. Singleton discussed a limited canon of
construction recognized by the Supreme Court in Nardone v. United States,
302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937) and United States v. Herron, 87 U.S. 251, 255 (1873).
Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1345-46. This canon provides that statutes do not apply
to the government unless the text expressly includes the government. Id. at
1345. However, the court stated that this cannon applies in only two classes of
cases. Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383, cited in Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1345-46. The
first class involves statutes that would deprive the government of established
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that because Congress intended to "prevent fraud upon the federal
courts in the form of inherently unreliable testimony," the statute
applied to the government.47 The plea deal the government offered
Douglas met the elements enumerated in the statute.4
Specifically, the government's promises were given "for or because
of' his testimony; Douglas agreed to testify "in consideration of"
the promises. 9 Indeed, the government's promises were "things of
value," according to abundant precedent. ° The court supported its
conclusion by stating that if the statute's purpose was to further
justice in the American system, § 201(c)(2) logically applied to all
parties within the system. 1 Purchased testimony averted
justice,
52
thereby rendering the purchaser's identity irrelevant.
Nine days after the Singleton decision was issued, the ruling
interests, such as statutes of limitation. Id. at 1346. The second class
involves statutes that would be absurd if applied to the government, such as
subjecting police officers to speed limits when chasing suspects. Id. The court
found that even if § 201(c)(2) would deprive the government of an established
interest, the canon of construction exempting the government from its
application still did not apply. Id. Statutes apply to the government in cases
where the operation of law is upon agents of the sovereign rather than on the
sovereign itself, and in cases where a statute's purpose is to prevent fraud,
injury, or wrong. See United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 184 (1935)
(holding that the Secretary of the Interior was subject to a law prohibiting
'any person" from constructing a dam on navigable waterways without the
consent of Congress). See also Nardone, 302 U.S. at 384 (holding that federal
agents were subject to the 1934 federal wiretap statute, which applied to
"anyone").
47. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346.
48. Id. at 1348.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1350. The Singleton court went on to cite several cases
supporting the proposition that "the promise of intangible benefits imports as
great a threat to a witness' truthfulness as a cash payment," including United
States v. Cervantes-Pacheco,826 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 1987), United States v.
Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980), and United States v. Kimble,
719 F.2d 1253, 1255-57 (5th Cir. 1983). Id. at 1350.
51. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346-47. The court also quoted Justice Brandeis'
dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928):
[d]ecency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperilled [sic] if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our
Government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies
the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order
to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution.
Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should
resolutely set its face.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485.
52. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1347.
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was vacated on the court's own initiative." The Tenth Circuit then
held an en banc hearing.54
During oral arguments, U.S.
prosecutors argued that the Singleton ruling would paralyze
federal prosecutors' abilities to do their jobs.55 John Val Wachtel,
Sonya Singleton's attorney, countered that witnesses could provide
alternative types of assistance to prosecutors in developing a case,
and that prosecutors did not need accomplice testimony in order to
prosecute criminals successfully.'
The court, however, reversed the panel's decision.57 The
majority held that the statute was inapplicable to prosecutors
acting as the "alter-ego" of the United States.5 The court reasoned
that if Congress intended to apply § 201(c)(2) to the United States
as an "inanimate entity," it would have used the word "whatever"
in the statute, rather than "whoever."5 Furthermore, the court
held that general statutes do not apply to the government unless
Congress makes the application "indisputable" by statutory
language.' The court concluded that Congress did not intend to
deprive the government of its "ingrained practice of granting
lenience in exchange for testimony" in the absence of such "clear,
unmistakable, and unarguable language."' One concurring justice
felt the statute was inapplicable in light of the existence of more
specific statutes in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which
allowed prosecutors to exchange leniency for testimony."
Additionally, he disagreed with the majority's reasoning by noting
that under Nardone v. United States and the Dictionary Act, the
term "whoever" does apply to the government.'
The original panel dissented, stating that the majority's
holding ignored the effect that exchanging leniency for testimony
has on the "integrity, fairness, and credibility" of the criminal
justice system.64 The dissent went on to discuss the tradition,

53. Id. at 1343, rehearingen banc granted, opinion vacated (July 10, 1998).

54. Id.
55. Sandy Shore, Plea-dealBan is 'Paralyzing,'U.S. Court Told, CHI. DAILY

L. BULL., Nov. 19, 1998, at Al. Andrew Cohen, a legal analyst who observed
the oral arguments, stated that the ruling, if upheld, could substantially
change criminal prosecutions. Id.
56. Id.

Wachtel noted his disagreement with prosecutors' argument by

stating that "[prosecutors have] got to be smarter than your average drug
dealers." Id.
57. United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).

58. Id. at 1300.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1301-02.
62. See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1301 (Lucero, J., concurring) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e), 28 U.S.C. § 994(n), 18 U.S.C. § 6001-05, and 18 U.S.C. §
3521-28).
63. Id. at 1304-05 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1).

64. Id. at 1309 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
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codified in state rules of ethics, of prohibiting payments to fact
witnesses.65
Since the rules bind federal prosecutors, the
majority's focus on statutory construction ignored other compelling
reasons for applying § 201(c)(2) to them as well.6
B.

Singleton's Progeny

Immediately after the original panel's decision, defense
attorneys across the United States rushed to file motions to
suppress testimony."
Several other courts declined to follow
Singleton, arguing that the precedent had no effect while it
awaited rehearing, and moreover that the Tenth Circuit Court's
decision was not binding on other circuits.6 In Florida, however,
U.S. District Court Judge William J. Zloch agreed with Singleton,
and in August 1998, he relied on it as a basis to suppress
65. Id. at 1313.

66. See id. at 1302-03 (Henry, J., concurring) (noting that legislation
holding federal prosecutors subject to state rules of ethics may, at some point,
require prosecutors to utilize other means of garnering testimony from
accomplices); id. at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (noting that prosecutors could
prosecute accomplices first, then compel their testimony by subpoena, or could
ask a court to compel testimony by a grant of immunity).
67. See cases cited infra note 68 for examples of such motions to suppress.
68. See United States v. Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d 715, 715 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(holding that § 201(c)(2) did not apply to the government because of the canon
of construction set forth in Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937)).
The court held that the Singleton panel read Nardone too narrowly. Id. at
717. The court also held that application of the statute would create an
absurdity when applied to federal prosecutors, noting that other statutes seem
to authorize grants of leniency in exchange for testimony. See 18 U.S.C. §§
6001-6005 (authorizing federal prosecutors to grant immunity from
prosecution in exchange for testimony); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (allowing the
government to make a motion for downward departure of sentences for people
who substantially assist in investigation or prosecution of others); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1997) (authorizing the
government to make motions for reductions of sentences). See also United
States v. Gabourel, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1246 (D. Colo. 1998) (rejecting the
defendant's assertion that a government's plea agreement with a witness
violated the defendant's due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963)); United States v. Barbaro, No. 98 CR. 412 (JFK), 1998 WL 556152,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 1998) (citing United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594 (1878)
and noting that the practice of offering cooperating accomplices leniency dates
back to the common law of England); United States v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp.
2d 521, 521 (E.D. Md. 1998) (noting that defendants' motions to suppress
relied solely on Singleton). The court held that since the ruling was vacated
pending an en banc hearing, the ruling had no legal authority. Eisenhardt, 10
F. Supp. 2d at 521. The court further concluded that the Singleton decision
was "amazingly unsound, not to mention nonsensical," since the ruling
prevents the admission of testimony from federal witnesses who cooperate. Id.
The Court further stated: "[t]he chances of either or both the Fourth Circuit
and the Supreme Court reaching the same conclusion as the Singleton panel
are, in this Court's judgment, about the same as discovering that the entire
roster of the Baltimore Orioles consists of cleverly disguised leprechauns." Id.
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testimony in several drug cases.69 Judge Zloch also granted two
70
other motions to suppress.
In the first of those decisions, United States v. Lowery,7 the
trial court found that the plea agreements granted to codefendants were in clear violation of § 201(c)(2), adopting the
reasoning presented in Singleton in its entirety.72 In Lowery, the
government argued that § 201(c)(2) did not apply to prosecutors.73
The government further argued that the Eleventh Circuit's74
decision in Golden Door Jewelry v. Lloyds Underwriters
previously determined that § 201(c)(2) applied only to false
testimony. 7 The government also contended that the more specific
provisions of other statutes granting authority to prosecutors to
reduce charges or recommend shorter sentences should prevail
over the general language of § 201(c)(2).7 ' Finally, it argued that
offering leniency in exchange for testimony was an established
practice of the executive branch and that such agreements did not
violate the Florida Bar Rules of Professional Conduct.77
The Lowery trial court concluded that the wording of §
201(c)(1) reveals no evidence of any legislative intent to exempt
prosecutors.
Specifically, § 201(c)(1) limits its application to

69. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 521.
70. See United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1120 (11th Cir. 1999)
(noting that Judge Zloch granted motions to suppress testimony in two
separate criminal trials). At issue in the consolidated appeal of three cases
were eight separate plea agreements granted to co-conspirators in exchange
for testimony. Id. at 1120-22. In Lowery, the agreements of four coconspirators explicitly stated that the government would not recommend
leniency if the witnesses offered false testimony. Id. at 1120. In two other
cases, none of the four plea agreements entered into by co-conspirators
explicitly referenced any consequences for giving false testimony. Id. at 1122.
71. United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
72. Id. at 1351.
73. Id. The court noted that the government did not, however, argue that
the clear language of § 201(c)(2) excluded the government from its application.

Id.
74. Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters NonMarine Ass'n, 117 F.3d 1328, 1328 (11th Cir. 1997).
75. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1356. In Golden Door, the court concluded
that when leniency or payments were offered to witnesses for truthful
testimony, the government did not violate § 201(c)(2). Golden Door, 117 F.3d
at 1335. The court based its decision on its prior holding in United States v.
Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1420 (11th Cir. 1992). In Moody, a defendant clearly
offered a bribe to a witness in exchange for testimony. Moody, 977 F.2d at
1421. The court rejected the defendant's argument that § 201(c)(2) was vague,
and stated that it "obviously proscribes a bribe for false testimony; persons of
ordinary intelligence would come to no other conclusion." Id. at 1425. The
Lowery court noted that Moody never intimated that § 201(c)(2) applied only to
false testimony, and therefore the Golden Door decision stretched the Moody
holding too far. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1356.
76. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1356.
77. Id.
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persons not acting in accordance with other laws for the proper
discharge of duty."8 Yet, the limiting language does not appear in
§ 201(c)(2).7" This distinction debunked arguments used in cases
refusing to follow Singleton-that the statute created an absurdity
when applied to the government by conflicting with other statutes
such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), and U.S.S.G.
§ 5K1.1, that give the government authority to move for downward
reductions of sentences. 8° The statute logically applies to the
government as well as to the defense because the statute aims to
combat inherently unreliable testimony.8 The trial court also held
that prosecutors violated the Florida Rules of Professional
Conduct by offering leniency in exchange for testimony, an act
prohibited by Rule 3.4 of the Florida Rules of Professional
Conduct."

78. Id. at 1357-58.
79. Id. Section 201(c)(1) also applies to "whoever", but when actions are
"otherwise ... provided by law for the proper discharge of duty," its
application is limited. Id. The court stated that since Congress clearly
exempted the Executive Branch from the reach of § 201(c)(1), Congress
intentionally chose not to exclude the Executive Branch from § 201(c)(2). Id.
The court agreed with the Singleton ruling, and stated that it was not proper
to create such an exemption judicially when Congress intentionally did not
include one. Id.
80. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual states: "[ulpon motion of the
government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense, the court may depart from the guidelines...." U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1997). The Lowery court was not convinced
that § 201(c)(2) conflicted with these other statutes, and proposed the
following reconciliation: Congress intended the substantial assistance statutes
to apply to forms of substantial assistance other than testifying at trial.
Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1357. Section 201(c)(2) would therefore be left to
apply specifically to testimony under oath at judicial proceedings. Id. This is
a logical harmonization of not allowing accomplice testimony because it is
inherently unreliable.
However, accomplices can offer information to
prosecutors and investigators, thereby allowing conspiracies to be infiltrated.
81. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1353. In support of this proposition, the
district court stated that "if the judicial process is tainted by the admission of
unreliable testimony induced by a defendant's promises, it is no less tainted by
the identical actions of the prosecutor." Id. The district court further stated
that when witnesses, for either side, know that promises for leniency or other
valuable things are highly intertwined with testimony, incentives to lie are
tremendous. Id. at 1354. Application of § 201(c)(2) to all parties, therefore,
does not work an absurdity, but works to preserve the integrity of the judicial
system. Id. From the district court's point of view, it is not the judiciary's job
to "rewrite Congressional intent simply because the plain meaning of a
statute, ignored for fifty years, suddenly has profound implications." Id. at
1355.
82. Id. at 1358. Rule 4-3.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct for the
FloridaBar (modeled on ABA Model Rule 4.3) states: "[a] lawyer shall not...
fabricate evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an
inducement to a witness ....
" Id. The court stated that nothing in the Rules
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Lowery was subsequently reversed on appeal.'
In its
reversal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that §
201(c)(2) did not apply to federal prosecutors, mainly because the
statute was not used as a basis for motions to suppress testimony
until decades after its inception. 4 The Eleventh Circuit also
rejected the argument that federal prosecutors violated the Florida
Rules of Professional Conduct by promising leniency in exchange
for testimony." While recognizing that federal law now subjects
federal prosecutors to state ethical rules, the court held that
violations of those rules did not warrant exclusion of evidence."
Reasoning that federal law governed the admissibility of evidence
in federal courts, the court stated that Rule 402 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence 87 did not mention state or local ethical rules as
bases for excluding otherwise relevant evidence.'
The court
concluded that the federal interest in law enforcement was
paramount to the states' interest in regulating professional
conduct.'
Therefore, even though 28 U.S.C. § 530B explicitly
holds federal prosecutors to state ethical standards, the court held
that Congress did not intend to render evidence garnered in
violation of those standards inadmissible.90

exempted the government from their application, and that the Rules did not
distinguish between truthful and false testimony in prohibiting offers of
inducements for testimony. Id.
83. United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999).
84. Id. at 1123-24. The court noted that testimony pursuant to plea
agreements was a "commonplace feature of trials... happen[ing] every work
day in federal trial courts all around [the] country." Id. at 1124.
85. Id. at 1124-25.
86. Id. at 1124. The court stated it was "far from clear" whether the
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct barred prosecutors from promising
leniency for testimony, even though the rules forbid attorneys from "offering
an inducement to a witness." Id.
87. FED. R. EVID. 402. Rule 402 states: "[a]ll relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible." Id.
88. Lowery, 166 F.3d at 1124-25.
89. Id. at 1124-25.
90. Id. at 1125. 28 U.S.C. § 530B may be an "Act of Congress" that would
render evidence inadmissible under Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 402. Furthermore, Rule 402 states the basic standard for
relevant evidence. Id. Rule 403 more properly addresses the issue of
exclusion. FED. R. EVID. 403. It reads: "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Id. Because testimony in exchange for leniency is
inherently unreliable, its probative value is arguably substantially outweighed
by the dangers of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. History of the Statutory Argument Used in Singleton
The defendant in Singleton took her argument from a letter
sent in May of 1995 by Attorney J. Richard Johnston to Michael E.
Shaheen, Counsel for the U.S. Department of Justice Office of
Professional Responsibility in Washington, D.C.9 '
Johnston
pointed out that the language of § 201(c)(2) made it an offense for
anyone to pay witnesses for testifying, and asked Shaheen
whether the Justice Department believed that the statute applied
to federal prosecutors.92 Johnston noted that while the language of
the statute explicitly included federal prosecutors, the Justice
Department had a long-standing practice of giving informants
money or favorable treatment in exchange for testimony. 9 Courts
traditionally admitted informant testimony, even when the
payment or favorable treatment was contingent upon conviction of
a defendant.94 Johnston unsuccessfully argued that, despite those
traditions of admitting paid informant testimony, § 201(c)(2), as
well as the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, now prohibited
such conduct on the part of prosecutors."
Counsel for Sonya

91. Johnston, supra note 26, at 21.
92. Id. The Department of Justice claimed that it was not subject to rules
of professional conduct in 1989, when former Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh issued "The Thornburgh Memorandum."
THORNBURGH
MEMORANDUM, in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489 (D.N.M. 1992); ELKAN
ABRAMOWITZ, Ex Parte Contacts from the Justice Department, N.Y.L.J., vol.
219, No. 40 (Mar. 3, 1998). In the memorandum, Thornburgh stated that an
"authorized by law" exception existed for federal prosecutors, which exempted
them from state rules of ethics. THORNBURGH MEMORANDUM, in In re Doe,
801 F. Supp. at 489. The District Court of New Mexico disagreed, and
instituted disciplinary actions against a federal prosecutor who contacted a
defendant in a murder case while knowing that the defendant was represented
by counsel. Id. The Justice Department later sought an injunction in the
disciplinary proceedings, arguing that the Department's rules superceded
stated ethical standards because of the supremacy of the federal government.
United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964, 964 (D.C. 1993), affd 54 F.3d 825,
825 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The New Mexico Supreme Court also disagreed with the
Justice Department's argument and publicly censured the prosecutor. In re
Howe, 940 P.2d 159, 159 (N.M. 1997). The Department of Justice's position
regarding state rules of ethics seems to have been mooted, however. On
October 20, 1998, Congress passed an amendment to 28 U.S.C. Chapter 31.
28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (1998). The amendment directs that United States
Attorneys be subject to state ethical rules, as well as local federal court rules
governing attorneys in their respective states. Id. See also J. Richard
Johnston, Plea Bargaining in Exchange for Testimony: Has Singleton Really
Resolved the Issues?, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1999, at 24, 26 (stating that Johnston
received a "non-responsive reply" from the Justice Department).
93. Johnston, supra note 26, at 21.
94. Id. at 23.
95. Id. at 24.
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Singleton made the same arguments in her motion to suppress
evidence.'
The Singleton panel opinion analyzed the problems inherent
in the use of accomplice testimony relative to the clear language of
the federal bribery statute. 7 While many members of the Bar
were surprised by the logic advanced in Singleton,98 this reasoning
was not new." As early as 1974, defendants argued that plea
agreements exchanging leniency for accomplice testimony violated
the federal bribery statute.'1 ° The Singleton panel was simply the
first court to hold that prosecutors' actions were illegal.''

96. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344.
97. Id. at 1348, 1352-54.
98. See Cooper, supra note 26, at 34 (citing attorneys surprised by the
Singleton ruling).
99. See United States v. Blanton, 700 F.2d 298, 298 (6th Cir. 1982) (using
the same reasoning and logic as Singleton later used).
100. United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1091 (7th Cir. 1974). In
Barrett, the defendant argued that the government violated former § 201(h)
(the identical predecessor to § 201(c)(2)) by entering into a plea agreement
with an accomplice. Id. at 1101. The defendant argued that by the terms of
the plea agreement, the government effectively paid the accomplice $1 million,
recommended a very light sentence for the accomplice, and urged the IRS to
exempt the accomplice from civil tax liability. Id. Since the government gave
the accomplice civil immunity in return for testimony, the government acted
in violation of the bribery statute by offering something of value for the
accomplice's testimony. Id. The defendant conceded that the government was
allowed to give immunity for criminal prosecution in exchange for testimony
by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 6002, which arguably authorized the government to do
so. Id. The court, sua sponte, found justification for the prosecution's actions
in 18 U.S.C. § 7122, which authorized prosecutors to grant exemption from
civil tax liability in cases arising under the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at
1101-02. The defendant also argued that the accomplice's civil immunity,
added to the huge sums of money he was able to keep tax free, heightened the
normal unreliability of accomplice testimony. Id. at 1102. The defendant
concluded that presentation of the accomplice's testimony was therefore a
violation of defendant's due process rights. Id. The court disagreed and
affirmed the defendant's conviction. Id. at 1103.
101. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1360-61. See, e.g., United States v. Blanton, 700
F.2d 298, 298 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that the government had not made an
improper arrangement with a testifying accomplice). In Blanton, Tennessee's
governor was prosecuted for a scheme involving the illegal issuance of liquor
licenses. Id. at 300. The testifying accomplice received a liquor license
illegally. Id. One of the terms of his plea agreement was that prosecutors
would recommend that his liquor license not be revoked. Id. at 310. The
defendant argued that prosecutors, through this agreement, violated former §
201(h) (the identical predecessor to § 201(c)(2)) by giving something of value to
the accomplice in exchange for his testimony. Id. The court held that
prosecutors did not give a thing of value to the accomplice. Id. at 311. The
court reasoned that prosecutors merely preserved the status quo of the
accomplice having the liquor license, and therefore did not give anything to
the accomplice. Id. Furthermore, the court held that neither the liquor
license nor the prosecutor's persuasion in urging the state liquor licensing
agency not to revoke the license were things of value. Id.
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B. Constructionof 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)
Prosecutors

opposing

subsequent

motions

to

suppress

evidence filed in Singleton's wake argued that the court
misconstrued § 201(c)(2). 10' Such arguments relied upon, in part,
two canons of statutory construction recognized in Nardone v.
United States that restricted application of certain statutes to the
government.'
The first of these arguments states that statutes
that would deprive the government of recognized or established
titles or interests do not apply to the government.1' The second
similarly declines to interpret statutes working "obvious
absurdities" as applicable to the government. 5 Based upon these
restrictions, various district courts held that § 201(c)(2) did not
apply to federal prosecutors." The Singleton court found that
neither of these canons of construction exempted prosecutors from
the reach of § 201(c)(2).' 0 ' Instead, the court noted that if
prosecutors were exempt from the statute's application, they
would not be prevented from actually bribing witnesses.1°
Singleton also relied on the plain language of the statute to justify
its application to federal prosecutors, stating that the term
"whoever" applied to everyone."° This construction of § 201(c)(2)
was in line with the United States Supreme Court's construction
of statutes with similar language. 10

102. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, No. 3:98CR64, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12675, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 28, 1998) (declining to follow Singleton).
103. 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 384. For example, requiring police to follow a speed limit while
chasing down a suspect is absurd. Id.
106. See, e.g., Reid, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12675 at *5 (stating that
application of § 201(c)(2) to federal prosecutors would work an obvious
absurdity).
107. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1345-46.
108. Id. at 1348. The Nardone court came to a similar conclusion, and held
that a federal wiretapping statute applied to federal agents. Nardone v.
United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382-83 (1937). In light of the holding in Nardone,
it seems that reliance on the canons of statutory construction recognized by
the Nardone court is misplaced. After discussing the canons of statutory
construction exempting the government from certain statutes, the Nardone
court rejected the application of those canons to the federal wiretapping
statute, which also included "any person." Id. at 384. The court stated that
the plain words of the statute included every person, so as to include federal
agents. Id. at 382. The government's argument that Congress did not intend
that the statute apply to the government did not persuade the court. Id. at
383. Instead, the court inferred that exempting federal agents from the
wiretapping statute would allow them to invade citizens' privacy, thereby
resorting to unethical standards in order to obtain evidence against suspected
criminals. Id.
109. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1345-46, 1348.
110. See Brogan v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 805, 808-09 (1997) (interpreting
18 U.S.C. § 1001 as including any false statement, and rejecting defendant's
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The question of whether accomplice testimony is inherently
unreliable has also been raised in relation to defendants'
guarantees of due process of law."' The argument asserted in such
cases is that contingent plea agreements give accomplices strong
motives to perjure themselves."'
These plea agreements offer
leniency to accomplices in exchange for testimony, usually
dependent upon conviction of co-defendants or upon prosecutors'
satisfaction with the testimony given."' Such agreements are not
dissimilar from the plea agreement in Singleton, which was
contingent upon both Douglas' full cooperation and the
prosecutor's decision whether to recommend a lesser sentence.
Where challenges based upon defendants' due process rights
have been raised, courts have held that contingent agreements do
not violate due process rights, if certain procedural safeguards are
followed."' Such safeguards include 1) reading the plea agreement
to the jury and making the agreement available during
deliberations, 2) allowing the defense lengthy cross-examination of
argument that the statute had an exception for the "exculpatory no" doctrine).
In Brogan, the defendant challenged his conviction for making a false
statement within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. Id. at 805. Section 1001
proscribes the making of any false statement. Id. at 808. The court rejected
the defendant's argument that an exception to the statute existed when a
person made a false statement while denying guilt. Id. The court stated that
it could not insert Congressional intent into a plainly worded statute. Id. at
809. The court further reasoned that it was illogical to read criminal statutes
more narrowly than they are written by subjecting them to case-by-case
review. Id. at 811. The court held that reading such statutes more narrowly

created a problem of not having a way of knowing when to invoke "userfriendly" readings of statutes. Id. Finally, the court argued that even when
attractive policy arguments exist, courts may not read in limitations to
statutes when no limitations exist within the text of statutes. Id. at 811-12.
111. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting) (stating that the government's grants of leniency and payment of
monies to an informant did not violate defendant's due process rights).
112. See generally Yvette A. Beeman, Accomplice Testimony Under
Contingent Plea Agreements, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 800, 800 (May 1987)
(arguing that courts should prohibit contingent plea agreements to
accomplices to obtain testimony).
113. Id.
114. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 200 (1st Cir. 1985)
(holding that as long as the procedural safeguards are followed, accomplices

are allowed to testify). In Dailey, the government appealed from a district
court ruling that excluded the testimony of three accomplices. Id. at 193. The
First Circuit noted that the lower court was correct in holding that the
contingent agreements offered to the accomplices provided some inducement
to lie in testimony against the defendant. Id. at 197. However, the circuit
court determined that the inducement created was no worse than that created
by other agreements upheld by other courts. Id. The First Circuit Court
reversed the district court's ruling and remanded the case for a new trial,
directing that the three accomplices be permitted to testify against the
defendant. Id. at 201.
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the accomplice about the plea agreement, and 3) issuing
cautionary instructions to the jury explaining the nature of the
agreement and the possibility that the accomplice had a motive to
commit perjury."6
Even when plea agreements created
substantial motives. 7 for accomplices to testify in a manner highly
damaging
to
defendants," 8
or
when
testimony
was
9
uncorroborated
and given
by
known
perjurers,
courts
still
20
admitted the testimony.

116. Id. at 200. The Dailey court stated that cautionary instructions to the
jury were especially warranted in cases where the accomplice's testimony was
uncorroborated by other evidence. Id.
117. Rohrlich, supra note 1, at Al.
See supra Introduction and
accompanying notes (describing the facts of Leslie White and his false
testimony).
118. See Saavedra v. Thomas, No. 96-2113, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 35017, at
*7 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that since accomplice was subjected to crossexamination and because trial court issued a general credibility instruction,
accomplice testimony was not unconstitutionally inadmissible). In Saavedra,
an accomplice who faced 74 years imprisonment in connection with charges of
armed robbery and aggravated assault testified against his co-defendant in
exchange for a recommendation of a three-year sentence from the government
on his guilty plea. Id. at *3. The government retained discretion to reject his
guilty plea if his testimony was not satisfactory. Id. at *4. See also United
States v. Wilson, 904 F.2d 656, 659-60 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that testimony
of accomplices did not deprive defendant of due process because the trial court
followed procedural safeguards). In Wilson, the court acknowledged that the
accomplices' plea agreements "contingently motivated" the accomplices to
testify. Id. at 659. In addition to immunity, the accomplices stood to gain
financially. Id. at 658. The court noted that plea agreements, in fact, offered
strong motives for accomplice witnesses to lie. Id. at 660. However, the court
further noted that the practice of offering plea agreements in exchange for
testimony was an ingrained practice. Id. at 660. The court also stated that
issues regarding favorable treatment, leniency, and payments of money
related to issues of credibility that were properly judged by the jury. Id. Only
in circumstances in which the jury could not accurately weigh witnesses'
credibility, such as an absence of procedural safeguards, could such testimony
deprive defendants of due process. Id.
119. See United States v. Garcia, 66 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating
that witnesses' motives for testifying do not make the subject matter of their
testimony inherently unreliable). In Garcia, the defendant argued that the
sentencing court placed too much weight on the unreliable testimony of an
accomplice witness. Id. at 855. The appellate court stated that such
arguments rarely sway courts of appeals, because district court findings
regarding credibility of witnesses will only be disturbed if such findings were
completely baseless. Id. at 856. The court noted that trial courts may rely on
the testimony of an admitted felon and perjurer who sold drugs on a large
scale and was a paid government informant, even if such testimony was
entirely uncorroborated. Id. at 857 (citing United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.3d
1341, 1347 (7th Cir. 1989)). See also Dailey, 759 F.2d at 198 (stating that
courts have allowed uncorroborated testimony by accomplices who were
admitted perjurers, even when the testimony was inconsistent).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253, 1256-57 (5th Cir.
1983) (holding that testimony of an admitted perjurer was sufficiently
believable to be admitted into evidence). In Kimble, the accomplice testifying
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Appellate courts are unlikely to reverse convictions based on
testimony obtained through contingent plea agreements.
For
example, courts have held that cautionary instructions regarding
uncorroborated accomplice testimony need not be given, as long as
the testimony is internally consistent.'21 While recognizing that
contingent plea agreements may offer accomplices an inducement
to lie,"' courts state that such agreements are necessary and
justified in some cases."
Assuming that the use of accomplice
testimony is necessary to ensure the conviction of criminals, courts
refuse to exclude the testimony in most cases, rationalizing that
an accomplice's motive for perjury arising from a plea agreement
goes to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility."
Criticisms of the current safeguards surrounding accomplice
testimony start from the fundamental premise that such
testimony is inherently unreliable. 25 In those few cases where

against the defendant received immunity from charges stemming from his
involvement in a conspiracy to violate RICO statutes. Id. at 1255. The
accomplice admitted he lied in over 30 different statements because he was
trying to obtain favorable treatment from prosecutors. Id. at 1256-57. The
defense cross-examined the accomplice and confronted him with prior
inconsistent statements. Id. at 1257. The trial judge also instructed the jury
several times to exercise caution in considering the accomplice's testimony and
in determining his credibility. Id. at 1255. The appellate court stated that the
issue of credibility properly went to the weight of the accomplice's testimony
and did not affect its admissibility. Id. at 1257.
121. See United States v. Fernandez, 145 F.3d 59, 62 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating
that it was not plain error to not give a cautionary instruction regarding
uncorroborated testimony so long as the testimony appeared to be internally
consistent).
122. See United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir.
1987) (stating that there may be no greater motivation to lie for an accomplice
than an offer of a reduced sentence).
123. See Dailey, 759 F.2d at 197 (stating that the use of open-ended and
vague contingent plea agreements was justified because accomplices were
assumed to know vast amounts of information, and the government wanted to
ensure that their cooperation was forthcoming).
124. See United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (1970) (stating the
importance of observing the established safeguards when accomplice
testimony is admitted). See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391, 396
(6th Cir. 1971) (noting that courts have not seriously attacked either the
practice of paying informants for testimony or the practice of giving reduced
sentences to accomplices for testimony, and that potential abuses exist in a
system that regularly pays witnesses, in some form or another, for testimony).
125. See Grimes, 438 F.2d at 395-96 (stating that similar contingent fee
agreements for informants may provide motives to lie in order to ensure
payment). The Grimes court stated that while contingent agreements for
witness testimony provide an "obvious potential for abuse," an exclusionary
rule would not be adopted. Id. at 396. Rather, agreements are disclosed to the
jury, who may consider the entirety of the witness' testimony and possible
motives for perjury. Id.
The court stated that this procedure would
adequately protect defendants from the risk of unfair trials because witnesses
would undergo rigorous cross-examination. Id.
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accomplice testimony has been excluded, courts allude to the
unreliability of testimony motivated by leniency, money, or both.'
In 1986, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that the
search for truth, central to the American justice system, could not
be reconciled with the use of testimony that was paid, bartered, or
bargained for.'27 Similarly, in 1984, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals questioned whether exchanging leniency for damaging
testimony created a risk of perjury so great that established
safeguards could not protect the defendant's due process rights."8
The court answered in the affirmative, stating that full disclosure
of the agreement to the jury was insufficient to overcome the due
process violation inherent in the agreement itself. 129
The weaknesses of the current safeguards are evident in
other instances as well. For example, some scholars note that
because trial courts do not always require corroboration of
accomplice testimony, jurors cannot fairly evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses, even where full disclosure of their plea
agreements is provided." Likewise, disclosure of agreements and
cross-examination of accomplices by defense counsel may not send
clear messages to juries to weigh such testimony carefully."'
While case law1 2 and the rules of ethics'2 ' prohibit prosecutors
126. See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 800 F.2d 452, 460 (5th
Cir. 1986) (holding that testimony of a government informant was "inherently
untrustworthy" and should have been excluded at trial). In CervantesPacheco, a government instructed an informant to infiltrate a drug ring and
gather information on a certain member of that ring. Id. at 454. The
informant's fee was contingent upon the conviction of the targeted individual.
Id. at 458. The informant's employer, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA),
had discretion over how much money the informant would be paid. Id. at 459.
The DEA did not pay the informant until the case was over. Id. The court
stated the terms of the agreement between the DEA and the informant gave
him a strong financial incentive to provide damaging testimony. Id. at 459-60.
127. Id. at 460-61.
128. See United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527, 1528, 1530 (8th Cir.
1984) (holding that the plea agreement violated the defendant's rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution). In Waterman, the agreement
offered to the defendant's accomplice was contingent upon continued
cooperation, and the indictment and conviction of others involved in an arson
scheme. Id. at 1528.
129. Id. at 1531. In addition to arguing that the plea agreement violated his
constitutional rights, the defendant argued in the district court that the
agreement violated the spirit of § 201(c)(2). Id. at 1530. The appellate court
did not address this argument. Id.
130. Christine J. Saverda, Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for
IncreasedEvidentiary Standards, 100 YALE L.J. 785, 796 (1990).
131. See United States v. Romer, 618 F.2d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding
that juries may believe the prosecutor is presenting "the truth," even where
the prosecutor informs them of the plea agreement).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, No. 96-4679, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
12310, at *13 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 1998) (noting that the government is prohibited
from bolstering or vouching for its witnesses).
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from vouching for the truthfulness of witnesses, prosecutors are
allowed to refer to the terms of plea agreements requiring
"truthful" testimony during direct examination. Tm This could alter
the effectiveness of defense counsel's cross-examination, as juries
may assume that the government is vouching for its witnesses."'
The denial of effective cross-examination destroys both a
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights" and guarantees of
reliability." 7
Admission of testimony not subject to crossexamination, however, is reviewed under a harmless error
standard," leaving little room for reversal of convictions. In the
relatively few instances where reversals were granted due to
admission of accomplice testimony, courts cited atypical, and
sometimes even outrageous, procedures as reasons for reversal.'39

133. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(e) (Discussion

Draft 1983) (stating that a lawyer shall not state personal opinions as to the
credibility of witnesses).
134. See, e.g., Romer, 148 F.3d at 369 (stating that courts generally allow the
prosecution to introduce the plea agreement offered to an accomplice on

direct).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 1980)
(noting that when a prosecutor offers a plea agreement into evidence on direct
of his witness, the jury may erroneously infer that the prosecutor knows "the
truth" and is presenting "the truth" to the jury via the witness). Courts have
sought to protect against this danger by limiting the prosecutor's ability to
refer to plea agreements on direct by: 1) directing that questions by
prosecutors may not imply that the government has any special knowledge
about the witness's character; 2) issuing cautionary instructions to the jury
regarding the credibility of accomplice witnesses; and 3) directing that the
prosecutor may not improperly refer to the witness' promise that she will
testify truthfully. Id. at 536.
136. See United States v. Stavroff, 149 F.3d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating
that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to confront
witnesses testifying against him).
137. For example, hearsay testimony may not be admitted if an accused will
not have an opportunity to effectively cross-examine a witness against him,
unless the hearsay comes within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Idaho v.
Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149-50 (1990). If indicia of reliability are not
present, and the accused is not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the

declarant, the hearsay statement is inadmissible because it is presumed to be
unreliable. Id. at 3150.
138. See id. at 3150-51 (stating that whether a hearsay statement overcomes
the presumption of unreliability with corroborating evidence is indicative of
whether admission of the statement was harmless error). See also Stavroff,
149 F.3d at 481 (stating that the absence of effective cross-examination may
be harmless when other corroborative evidence is present).
139. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 14 (1967) (involving the
denial of defendant's right to compulsory process to confront accomplice
witnesses testifying against him); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487,
487 (1962) (involving a coerced guilty plea); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,
264 (1959) (involving the knowing use of perjured testimony by prosecutors);
Swartz v. Iowa, 506 N.W.2d 792, 792 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (involving the
passive use of perjured testimony by prosecutors).
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The current safeguards, therefore, are inadequate because
they do not right the imbalance created when the government
procures accomplice testimony.
The Singleton panel decision
recognized that government prosecutors have an unfair advantage
over defendants in the adversarial trial process 4 ° because of the
power afforded them in charging, obtaining evidence, and
sentencing."4
Another case presented a similar argument to the Fifth
Circuit a few months before Singleton.14
In United States v.
Garcia-Abrego, the defendant argued that he was denied due
process because the government employed various tools at its
disposal to obtain accomplice testimony against him.4 4
The
140. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1358. See also Brief Amicus Curiae of National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 10-11, Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1343
(noting the increase in prosecutorial discretion and power over time in the
American system). The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
argued that prosecutors stretching the limits of due process and the hesitance
of courts to intervene increase the inherent inequalities between prosecutors
and defendants in the adversarial system. Id. Additionally, the Association
argued that the increased number of federal crimes and the push for minimum
mandatory sentencing, which has in turn solidified prosecutors' power to
induce plea-bargaining, exacerbates the problem of inequality. Id. at 10. See
also Roberta K Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updatingthat Ethics Codes to
Include the Non-AdversarialRoles of FederalProsecutors,37 B.C. L. REV. 923,

925 (1996) (stating that the number of federal crimes grew from 115 in 1975 to
3,000 in 1994).
141. See ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA 38-39 (1981) (stating that adopting rules
and procedures governing plea negotiations, such as Rule 11(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure legitimized prosecutors' plea-bargaining powers);
T. KENNETH MORAN & JOHN L. COOPER, DISCRETION AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROCESS 60-61 (1983) (stating that a prosecutor decides whether to

charge an accused person with crimes, and is motivated to seek plea bargains
in order to assure the public that prosecutors are doing a good job in punishing
criminals). Abraham Goldstein states that the judiciary has been hesitant to
review discretion exercised by prosecutors acting for the executive branch
because of a misconception of the separation of powers, a fear of being
overwhelmed by enlarged dockets, and widespread resistance from
prosecutors. GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 57-58, 68. See also Robert H. Jackson, The
Federal Prosecutor,24 J. OF AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 18, 19 (1940) (stating that

prosecutors have more power over the lives and liberty of American citizens
than anyone else in the judicial system). Then Attorney General, and future
Supreme Court Justice, Jackson further stated that prosecutors' powers are
enormous. Id. Prosecutors decide whether to investigate or charge people and
need not justify reasons for doing so to any reviewing authority. Id.
Discretion thus leads to selective enforcement of the law, a practice that is
firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence. Id.
142. United States v. Garcia-Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 142 (5th Cir. 1988).
143. Id. at 151. The government used its power to make motions for
downward departure pursuant to § 5kl.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
and to recommend reductions in sentences and its influence in obtaining
immigration permits, cash payments, and grants of immunity to induce
testimony against Garcia-Abrego. Id.
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defendant claimed that the adversarial process was so skewed
against him that his constitutional rights were violated, since he
could not offer similar incentives to obtain testimony in his
favor.'" Interestingly, the defendant in Garcia-Abrego did not
seek to suppress the testimony; he merely argued that the lack of
equality between the parties'
ability to entice witnesses led to a
14
constitutional violation.

5

The defendant's argument in Garcia-Abregois consistent with
the reasoning behind ethical rules. 14 '
The Singleton panel
recognized the same logic in holding that prosecutors violated the
rules of ethics by paying a witness for testimony.'47 The panel
observed that cases applying ethical rules to federal prosecutors
supported its ruling, and that federal courts had uniformly
denounced attempts to exempt federal prosecutors from ethical
standards.'" Assuming that the adversarial model followed by the
American justice system seeks to bring out the truth in a manner
most fair to both sides, neither side should be afforded any undue
advantage. The American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct recognize this assumption. 149 The ABA

144. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) (1999).
145. Garcia-Abrego, 141 F.3d at 152. The court rejected the defendant's

argument. Id. Alternatively, Garcia-Abrego argued that the court erred in
not giving his proposed jury instruction regarding the prosecution's ability,
and defendant's inability, to induce witnesses. Id. The proposed jury
instruction detailed the ways in which prosecutors could induce testimony
from accomplice witnesses. Id. The prosecution's ability to enter a § 5k1.1
motion recommending a downward departure before sentencing was
mentioned, as well as the prosecution's ability to file a motion pursuant to
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedureafter sentencing. Id. The
court rejected this argument as well, stating that pattern cautionary
instructions sufficed in such instances. Id. at 153-54.
146. Id.
147. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1360. J. Richard Johnston, in his article relied
on by Sonya Singleton, stated that allowing prosecutors to violate state rules
of ethics was a threat to judicial integrity. Johnston, supra note 26, at 21, 24.
148. Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1354. The court noted that the Department of
Justice twice attempted to exempt its prosecutors from state ethical rules: first
by way of the Thornburgh Memorandum; and second through federal
regulations. Id. The memorandum and regulation both attempted to exempt
federal litigators from ex parte communications with unrepresented parties,
and courts uniformly rejected both. Id. Congress recently agreed with court
decisions by requiring federal prosecutors to adhere to state rules of ethics. 28
U.S.C. § 530B(a),
149. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) cmt. 1
(Discussion Draft 1983) states:
[t~he procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence
in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the contending parties.
Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions
against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing
witnesses, obstructive tactics in the discovery procedure, and the like.
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Model Rules also note that it is improper for prosecutors to pay
any occurrence witness, with the exception of reimbursement for
reasonable witness expenses. 50 Similar state rules of ethics have
been incorporated into the local rules of some federal district
courts.'5' The ABA has further stated that reimbursements to fact
witnesses for expenses may not include payments for the
substance of the witness' testimony nor serve as an inducement for
testimony.'
Courts also allude to the disparity between the
practice of allowing prosecutors to pay witnesses for testimony
while not permitting defendants to do the same.'
In the civil
context, courts have consistently held that payments for nonexpert testimony violate the rules of ethics.'
Ethical rules governing the Bar are promulgated to ensure a
fair trial process.
Prosecutors are regarded differently from
defense counsel in this process because, as government
representatives, they have an ethical duty to seek justice."
Individual prosecutors have duties to ensure fair trials for
defendants and take care that innocent people are not convicted.'6
Employment of those duties is consistent with the government's
interest in the administration of its own justice system. 57
Professor Fred Zacharias believes that the inclusion of prosecutors
in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct suggests that they can
seek justice while operating within the ethical constraints imposed
150. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS Standard 3-3.2 (1993) states that a
prosecutor should not compensate witnesses for giving testimony, with the
exception of compensation for things such as transportation and loss of
income.
151. See LOCAL RULES OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS Rule 3.3(15) (1999) for an example of a federal local rule
adopting a state rule of ethics.
152. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96402 (1996).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 316 (5th
Cir. 1987) (Rubin, J., concurring) (stating that prosecuting attorneys are
allowed to present evidence in criminal cases that is obtained by breaching
ethical rules). Judge Rubin stated that to properly balance adverse parties'
abilities, defendants should be allowed to pay witnesses contingent upon
acquittal. Id. However, Judge Rubin felt that this practice would result in a
perversion of the trial process. Id.
154. See, e.g., Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters
Non-Marine Ass'n, 865 F. Supp. 1516, 1525 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that
payment by plaintiffs counsel to non-expert witnesses for testimony, while not
in violation of § 201(c)(2), clearly violated the Rules of Professional Conduct).
Incidentally, the government relied on this case in Singleton to support its
view that payment for truthful testimony did not violate § 201(c)(2).
Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1358.
155. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1) (1999)
(stating that government lawyers are "minister[s] of justice").
156. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring that Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial
Practice:Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 50 (1991).
157. Id.
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on all other lawyers." Prosecutors have a duty to ensure some
semblance of parity within the justice system because, as
government representatives, they are charged with protecting the
fairness of that system."
III. PROPOSAL
A. The Conviction Conundrum
Federal courts rejecting the panel's application of § 201(c)(2)
to prosecutors have ignored the significance of the ethical
violations that accompany agreements such as the one at issue in
Singleton." Even if courts adopt the government's construction of
§ 201(c)(2), the concomitant ethical violations should produce the
same result as that in the panel decision.'
The Singleton panel's
ultimate conclusion that prosecutors violated the rules of ethics is
consistent with the plain language of Rule 3.4(b) of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct."2 The panel's finding is also
consistent with congressional intent concerning the duties of
prosecutors." Finally, the Singleton panel's finding is consistent
with the spirit of the adversarial system.
Prosecutors argue that the practice of giving things of value
to witnesses in exchange for testimony is well established and that
the practice should not be questioned.'
They claim that many
convictions will not be obtained absent testimony from
M
T

158. Id. at 52.
159. Id. at 77-78.
160. United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1124 (11th Cir. 1999).
161. Zacharias, supra note 156, at 50.
162. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) (1999);
Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1360 (10th Cir. 1998).
163. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (directing that federal prosecutors conform to
the rules of ethics in states where they practice); supra note 92 (explaining

how 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) applies state ethical and local rules to federal
prosecutors).
164. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) cmt. 1 (1999)
(stating that fair competition in the adversary system is secured by

prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly
influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594, 599 (1878) (discussing the
history of plea agreements in exchange for testimony). Justice Clifford noted
that the modern practice of plea agreements probably evolved from the

"ancient and obsolete" practice called approvement. Id. Approvement was
allowed only in capital cases. Id, Where a person accused of a capital crime
accused an accomplice of the same crime, the accusation was effectively an
indictment. Id. The accused accomplice had to answer and defend the charge.
Id. If the accomplice was acquitted, the approver, the person originally
charged with the crime, was "condemned." Id. If, however, the accomplice
was found guilty and convicted of the capital offense, the approver was
entitled to a pardon. Id.
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accomplices.'
They cite precedent holding that existing
safeguards adequately protect defendants' rights.'67 Attorneys
General have even gone so far as to suggest that prosecutors
should not be held to ethical rules."1
1. ProsecutorsShould Not Use Leniency as a Crutch for Weak
Cases
Admittedly, the practice of giving immunity to witnesses does
have a long history.'69 Granting immunity in order to compel
testimony, however, is different from the kind of plea agreements
more recently used by prosecutors to obtain convictions.
Immunity is a tool used to compel testimony from people who
exercise their Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate
themselves. It is most effective in cases where the government
has insufficient evidence to obtain a conviction absent the
testimony of an accomplice. In such cases, prosecutors must forego
one prosecution in order to succeed in another. Theoretically, the
conviction sought must be important enough to justify the
immunity given to another culpable person.
Modern plea
agreements that prosecutors use differ. The agreements typically
offer accomplice witnesses immunity from prosecution for the
crime at issue, and additionally may offer other benefits such as
immunity from prosecution for other unrelated crimes, breaks in
sentences, monetary incentives, favorable treatment during
incarceration, or reductions of jail sentences. Modern practices
raise several questions, such as whether one conviction is
important enough to justify granting immunity for several crimes
committed by a culpable person, 170 whether paying sometimes very
large amounts of money to a person who may be culpable is

166. See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 1971)
(holding that accomplice testimony does not violate a defendant's due process
rights when the plea agreement between the accomplice and the prosecution is
disclosed).
167. Id.
168. ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 92, at 3 (stating that the memorandum
advised Justice Department attorneys that they were not bound by the rules of
ethics applicable to all other attorneys in regard to communications with
represented parties). The memorandum suggested that communications with
represented persons were important to law enforcement. Id. The government
argued the "law enforcement justification" in Singleton and its progeny as a
justification for exempting prosecutors from the federal bribery statute and
from state ethical rules. See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1352-53 (stating that the
government put forth a "vague argument that some overriding policy should
prevent application of [§ 201(c)(2)] to the government's conduct").
169. See Ford, 99 U.S. at 599 for further discussion.
170. See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344 (stating that the agreement given to
Douglas to testify included promises that he would not be prosecuted for
crimes unrelated to the wire fraud investigation at issue).
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ethical, 7' and whether the law should encourage practices that
allow prisoners to avoid the punishments society has deemed
appropriate for their crimes. 7' Furthermore, if a prosecutor's case
is so weak that he must resort to offering a generous plea
agreement, one wonders whether charges should be filed at all.'73
As defense attorneys have pointed out, accomplices can
provide substantial assistance to law enforcement officers and
"'
prosecutors without actually testifying. 74
The use of informers'75
undoubtedly predates the practice of granting immunity and
modern plea agreements. Informers differ from accomplices in
terms of motivation. Informers are often motivated by patriotism,
morals, money, or other personal reasons. Accomplices testifying
pursuant to plea agreements, however, are often motivated by selfpreservation. Deals allowing accomplices to stay out of jail, get
out of jail, or keep money that was illegally obtained may create
pressure to lie. This fact reveals the danger of using accomplice
testimony. When a culpable person is offered a choice between
seventy-four years in prison or three years' probation with the
stipulation that she will help a prosecutor make a case against her
accomplice, she will often opt for the latter choice. 7 '
171. See United States v. Wilson, 904 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding
that leniency and payment of up to $11 million to government witnesses did
not compromise trial so much as to violate the due process rights of
defendants).
172. See Ted Rohrlich & Robert W. Stewart, Jailhouse Snitches; Trading
Lies for Freedom, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1989, at Al (stating that in addition to

reduced sentences, jailhouse informants sometimes receive other rewards as
well). The story of Sidney Storch is one example of a jailhouse informant
receiving a reduced sentence by testifying about other inmates' alleged
confessions. Id. Storch received at least three felony convictions in California.
Id. By informing on other inmates, Storch spent only seven months in state
prison. Id. Rewards received by informants include increased access to
"creature comforts" in jails, opportunities to participate in field trips outside of
jail (otherwise known as undercover operations with police), and cash
payments ranging from five dollars from police officers to thousands of dollars
from witness protection funds. Id.
173. See Ted Rohrlich, Bar Launches Probe on Use of Jail Informants, L.A.

TIMES Nov. 30, 1988, at B1 (discussing an investigation of Los Angeles County
Prosecutors by the State Bar of California). Trev Davis, the Bar's Assistant
Chief Trial Counsel, stated that the main issue being investigated was

whether prosecutors knowingly used unreliable informants in a quest to
obtain as many convictions as possible. Id.
174. See generally Rohrlich, supra note 1, at Al (explaining that law

enforcement authorities do not rely solely on informant's testimony but
compare the informant's story with facts known only to the criminal and the
police).
175. For purposes of this Comment, "informers" are people who do not
participate in the crimes about which they give information.
176. See Saavedra v. Thomas, No. 96-2113, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 35017, at
*1-2 (10th Cir. Dec. 12, 1997) (arguing that the government violated
defendant's due process rights by inducing his co-defendant to testify against
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2. UnreliableTestimony Should Be Excluded
Courts have used the following remedies to protect against
convictions possibly based on peijury. First, the plea agreement
must be disclosed to the jury so that the defendant may impeach
the witness with his motive for testifying.177 This rule, while
appearing sufficient in the abstract, is effectively skirted when the
prosecution is able to allude to the plea agreement in its case in
chief, thereby downplaying the effect of cross-examination of an
accomplice witness.'78 Furthermore, a savvy witness will not likely
be tripped up on cross-examination about his agreement.
Second, some courts require that limiting instructions be
given to the jury when accomplice testimony is unreliable.' 79
However, as noted above, not all courts require such instructions,
even when the testimony is uncorroborated. 8' Since there is no
clear rule on whether to give cautionary instructions or how
specific they should be, this remedy is currently insufficient.
Juries may not get cautionary instructions at all, or may get

him). The co-defendant faced 74 years of imprisonment if convicted of all
charges against him. Id. at *3. If the co-defendant pleaded guilty, the
government agreed to recommend a sentence of 18 years imprisonment. Id. If
the co-defendant pleaded guilty and testified against the defendant, the
government agreed to recommend a sentence of three years probation. Id.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (stating that
evidence favorable to the accused, such as plea agreements, must be disclosed
to the defendant as impeachment evidence). The Supreme Court stated that
the reason for requiring production of impeachment evidence is to ensure that
a miscarriage of justice does not occur. Id. The court further noted that a
jury's judgment of the reliability of a witness may determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for that reason, impeachment evidence must be
made available to the defendant. Id. at 676 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264,269 (1959)).
178. See United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating
that a jury's impression of the prosecution vouching for the truth of an
accomplice witness may, in reality, preclude effective cross-examination).
179. See, e.g., State v. Ott, 217 Wis. 2d 290, 293 n.2 (1998) (citing WIS. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 245 (1991)) (regarding accomplice testimony). The
pattern instruction states:
[a] verdict of guilty may be based upon this testimony provided it is of
such a character, taken in connection with all the other evidence in the
case, as to satisfy you of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt. But ordinarily, it is unsafe to convict upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice.
Therefore, you should examine this
evidence with the utmost care and caution, scrutinize it closely, and
weigh it in the light of all the attending evidence. You should not base a
verdict of guilty upon it alone, unless after such scrutiny and
consideration it satisfies you of the guilt of the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Id.
180. See United States v. Fernandez, 145 F.3d 59, 62-63 (1st Cir. 1998)
(stating that cautionary instructions do not have to be given when accomplice
testimony is uncorroborated, as long as the testimony is internally consistent).
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instructions that are worded so generally that they fail to clearly
signal the suspicion of accomplice testimony that jurors should
harbor in such situations.
The current remedies do not level the playing field in pursuit
of the fundamental fairness that the adversarial justice system
theoretically aims to achieve. They do not overcome the fact that
accomplice testimony is inherently unreliable.
The easiest
solution, therefore, is to do away with the problem.
When
accomplices give information to prosecutors, they should not be
allowed to testify.
3. Courts Should Demand Fairness
More than one hundred years ago, the United States Supreme
Court held that plea agreements were enforceable 8' and stated
that accomplice witnesses had equitable rights to leniency when
giving information.182 At the same time, however, the Court noted
the importance of judges as gatekeepers of evidence." The Court
stated that judges must be satisfied by the veracity of accomplices'

statements before allowing such testimony.' The same holds true
today. Judges, under rules of evidence, have the discretion to
exclude evidence that may lead juries to draw inferences based on
the assumption that the evidence is reliable when, in fact, it is
not.& Such unreliable evidence includes accomplice testimony. 1m
There is no guarantee for its truth..7 and no real deterrent for
accomplices who are inclined to lie. Exclusion of this evidence on
this basis is both justified and rational.
Barring this controversial approach, extremely detailed and
explicit jury instructions can be uniformly required in cases where

181. See United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594, 605 (1878) (stating that public
policy required that agreements between prosecutors and accomplices should
be carried out).
182. See id. at 604 (stating that an accomplice witness is equitably entitled
to a pardon when he 1) gives information to prosecutors, 2) is informed of his
right not to incriminate himself, 3) testifies about his own acts, and 4) testifies
about the acts of his accomplices in the crime charged).
183. See id. at 603, cited in 1 PHIL. EVID. 87 (1868) (stating that "the court,
in view of all the circumstances [surrounding the plea agreement], will admit
or disallow the evidence as will best promote the ends of public justice .... ).
184. See Ford, 99 U.S. at 603 (discussing whether accomplices testifying

pursuant to plea agreements were entitled by equity to mercy). The Court
inferred that if a judge were not satisfied with the accomplice's integrity or the
veracity of his testimony, the accomplice should not be admitted as a witness.

Id.
185. See FED. R. EVID. 801-07 (explaining the requirements of and the
exceptions to the Hearsay Rule).
186. Id.
187. FED. R. EVID. 807 (stating that hearsay testimony, which is generally
inadmissible, may be admitted when supported by circumstances that
guarantee its trustworthiness).
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accomplices testify in exchange for leniency or other valuable
incentives. Judges have the power both to allow such detailed
cautionary instructions and to set precedent requiring them.
Courts acknowledge that they may exercise such supervisory
powers to preserve individual rights and to preserve judicial
integrity."
At the very least, cautionary instructions clearly
announcing the need for juries to examine the possible motives of
witnesses are superior to the current instructions, which are often
haphazardly given and oftentimes vague. Detailed instructions
will ensure fairness to defendants in a more consistent manner,
and will ensure that juries base convictions on fully informed
decisions. 89
B. The Ethical Conundrum
1. ProsecutorsMust Be Held to the Same EthicalStandardsas
All Other Attorneys
Recently, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 530B, the statute
that governs the actions of federal prosecutors, requiring federal
prosecutors to adhere to state ethical standards.19' The statutory
addition requires the Department of Justice to make new rules
and alter old ones in an effort to ensure compliance with state
rules of ethics.'
As Congress clearly sought to deter the
government from using unethical methods to gain convictions, the
amendment should end any debate about what Congress intended9
by failing to exclude prosecutors from the scope of § 201(c)(2).1 2
Since the federal bribery statute and state rules of ethics apply to
prosecutors, the practice of bargaining for accomplice
testimony is,
93
in fact, rendered illegal at the federal level."
188. See United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1984)
for further discussion.
189. See United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1463 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating
that preserving judicial integrity includes ensuring that convictions are based

on "appropriate considerations validly before the jury," and that federal courts
have an "independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials... appear fair
to all who observe them").
190. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (1990).

191. Id.
192. But see United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1125 (11th Cir. 1999)

(stating the belief that Congress, while subjecting federal prosecutors to state
rules of ethics, did not intend to render evidence obtained in violation of those
rules inadmissible).

193. While many state witness bribery statutes explicitly exclude bargains
for "truthful" testimony, state rules of ethics still preclude state prosecutors
from bargaining for testimony. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/32-4c (West
1997) (articulating the Illinois rule on witness bribery); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3024-2 (Michie 1978) (articulating the New Mexico rule on witness bribery). The
Illinois statute states:
[a] person who, after the commencement of a criminal prosecution, has

1999]

The Ethics of PurchasingTestimony

Payments to fact witnesses-aside from reasonable expenses
of travel, lost work, etc.-are prohibited in civil cases." As noted
in the Singleton panel decision, courts have excluded such
testimony procured in violation of ethical rules, regardless of
whether the purchased testimony was true or false. 195 In the
criminal context, however, courts continue to allow prosecutors to
purchase testimony by turning a blind eye to ethical rules
expressly prohibiting the practice. Courts thus effectively exempt
prosecutors from the very rules designed to promote fairness in the
adversary system. The only argument in support of this practice
is that prosecutors are charged with convicting bad people. But
the argument fails, however, because government prosecutors also
have a duty to ensure that innocent people are not convicted."9 It
is understandable, therefore, to expect prosecutors to adhere to the
same ethical rules as other attorneys. For these reasons, the
exclusion of accomplice testimony is not only rational, it is
required.

been identified in the criminal discovery process as a person who may be
called as a witness in a criminal proceeding shall not accept or receive,
directly or indirectly, any payment or benefit in consideration for
providing information obtained as a result of witnessing an event or
occurrence or having personal knowledge of certain facts in relation to a
criminal proceeding... . This Section does not apply to any of the
following circumstances... . To the lawful compensation or benefits
provided to an informant by a prosecutor or law enforcement
agency ....
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/32-4c. The New Mexico statute states:
[b]ribery or intimidation of a witness consists of any person knowingly:
(1) giving or offering to give anything of value to any witness or to any
other person likely to become a witness in any judicial, administrative,
legislative or other official cause or proceeding to testify falsely or to
abstain from testifying to any fact in such cause or proceeding ....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-24-2.
See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 133

(restricting attorneys from expressing personal opinions about the credibility
of witnesses).
194. See, e.g., Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters
Non-Marine Ass'n, 865 F. Supp. 1516, 1524-25 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that

payments by plaintiffs counsel to fact witnesses violated the FloridaRules of
Professional Conduct). The fact that the payments were conditioned upon
truthful testimony made no difference; the payments were illegal. Id. at 1525.
The court stated that the proper remedy was exclusion of all evidence "tainted
by the ethical violation." Id. at 1526.
195. See, e.g., id. at 1526.
196. See Zacharias, supra note 156, at 57 (noting that prosecutors are
simultaneously responsible for protecting the community, representing victims
of injustice, and ensuring that defendants have a "fair opportunity for
vindication").
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2. Exclusion of Unethically Obtained Testimony Is an Appropriate
Remedy
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter conduct
deemed antithetical to the individual rights the rule seeks to
protect. 97 Courts have recognized that the exclusionary rule
protects those rights in a systematic fashion. 9 ' Some courts hold
that suppression of unethically obtained evidence is the proper
remedy for ethical violations.'
Other courts state that the proper
remedy for ethical violations is disciplinary action against
individual attorneys.2"
Disciplinary proceedings against individual prosecutors who
violate ethical rules, however, are rare. 20'
This is especially
apparent when the widespread, systematic acceptance of allowing
prosecutors to purchase testimony is considered. The practice of
giving things of value in exchange for testimony is an institutional
practice followed by prosecutors' offices around the country.
Discipline of individual attorneys is unlikely to achieve the
systematic protection of rights and substantive fairness envisioned
by the rules of ethics. "The Bar does not discipline institutions." 2
Exclusion of purchased testimony is an appropriate and logical
remedy for ethical violations. It can be easily implemented in a
uniform manner, thereby addressing ethical violations on
institutional levels. Exclusion of purchased testimony is also more
apt to deter unethical conduct by individual prosecutors.
CONCLUSION

The Singleton panel decision was correct. The panel based its
decision on the clear language of § 201(c)(2), which precludes
prosecutors from giving, offering or promising anything of value to
witnesses in exchange for testimony. It promotes ethical rules

197. United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
198. Id.
199. See United States v. Hammad, 846 F.2d 854, 857-59 (2d Cir. 1988) cited
in Guerrerio, 675 F. Supp. at 1436 (finding that a prosecutor's violation of
state rules of ethics required suppression of evidence as a remedy).
200. See Guerrerio, 675 F. Supp. at 1435-36 (holding that disciplinary action
is a better deterrent than exclusion of evidence). The court, however, noted
that the exclusionary rule was not intended to punish, but to create an
incentive to uphold individual constitutional rights. Id. at 1434.
201. See Kenneth Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, § 1, at 1 (stating that since 1963, at least 381 people
convicted of murder in the U.S. have had their convictions overturned due to
prosecutorial misconduct). In many of those cases, prosecutors either
concealed exculpatory evidence, or knowingly allowed false evidence to be
admitted. Id. None of those prosecutors were barred from practicing law; only
one prosecutor out of the 381 cases discussed had his law license suspended.
Id. His license was reinstated after 59 days. Id.
202. Editorial, The Bar Looks at Informants, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1988, at B6.
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that preclude prosecutors from compensating fact witnesses for
testimony. The panel also based its decision on the goal of the
adversarial justice system-to get to the truth of matters in a
manner that is fair to both sides.
Prosecutors may still garner information from accomplices.
This information can be used to investigate crimes and to obtain
reliable evidence. Because law enforcement will still have such
information available, its efforts will not be unduly hampered by
exclusion of accomplice testimony.
Even if § 201(c)(2) is amended by Congress to allow an
exception for prosecutors, and even if the Supreme Court at some
point holds that procedural considerations should allow
prosecutors to give leniency or other consideration in exchange for
testimony, the rules of ethics will remain. There should not be one
set of ethical standards for prosecutors and another set for defense
attorneys. The interests of justice dictate that trials be fair, which
means that both sides must play by the same rules and that
convictions must be based on reliable evidence.

